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http://ww=
w.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-iraqsarin.asp
Report Confirms Iraq
Used Sarin in 1991
Michael Nguyen
U.S.
investigators have confirmed that Iraq
used chemical weapons to quash a Shiite uprising after the 1991 Persian
Gulf War. The information was uncovered by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG),=
the
task force established following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 to deter=
mine
the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs, but was
little noticed when the ISG issued its final three-volume report in
September 2004.
The report marked the first outside confirmation that the regime had
used chemical weapons to quell a growing 1991 insurgency. At the time, =
much
of Iraq=
was
in open revolt, the report notes, and the Iraqi regime was deeply shake=
n by
the fall of Karbala to Shii=
te
rebels. The report said the use of chemical weapons was an example of t=
he
“dire nature of the situation” and the regime’s
“faith in ‘special weapons’” that it would cons=
ider
using chemical weapons while coalition forces were still in Iraq.
Still, the scale of nerve weapon use by the Hussein regime against t=
he
Shiites in southern Iraq appears to be much smaller than a March 1988
chemical weapons attack against Kurds in northern Iraq or the
regime’s use of chemical weapons during an eight-year war with Ir=
an
in the 1980s. Post-Gulf War restrictions imposed on Iraq
after its defeat by a U.S.-led coalition may have limited the effective=
ness
of the attacks and prevented greater casualties, the report said.
The ISG uncovered the incident through interviews with several membe=
rs
of the Iraqi chemical weapons program. But public attention focused on =
the
report’s broader conclusions that =
Iraq
had destroyed its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, as wel=
l as
eliminated its nuclear weapons program by the time of the invasion. (See ACT, No=
vember
2004.)
Hussein Kamel, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and then-head of the
Military Industrial Commission, gave the order to ready chemical muniti=
ons
for use. According to the report, Kamel’s first chemical agent ch=
oice
was VX, a nerve agent. When informed that there was no VX available, the
Iraqis selected sarin, another nerve agent, declining to use mustard gas
because it was easily detectable.
Technicians from the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE), Iraq’s
primary chemical weapons research, development, and production facility,
mixed sarin components in R-400 aerial bombs at the Tamuz air base on M=
arch
7. MI-8 helicopters from nearby bases were armed with the R-400s and fl=
ew
sorties against Shiite rebels near Karbala.
One account from a senior official suggests that the helicopters dropped
10-20 sarin-filled bombs, although another account suggests that the to=
tal
may have been as high as 32.
Although the report notes that Iraq
had used the MI-8 helicopter in the 1980s to drop chemical munitions du=
ring
the Iraq-Iran War, the R-400—an aerial bomb of Iraqi design—=
;did
not enter service until 1990. Originally designed for low-altitude,
high-speed delivery of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq’s
fighter aircraft, the R-400s “most likely did not activate proper=
ly
when dropped from a slow moving helicopter,” according to the rep=
ort.
Cease-fire restrictions negotiated by the U.S.-led coalition at Safwan =
just
days earlier prohibited Iraq=
from flying fixed-wing aircraft, although Iraq
convinced the coalition to allow it to continue flying helicopters,
supposedly to transport Iraqi officials.
Following an angry call to a senior chemical weapons official about =
the
failure of the initial helicopter sorties, technicians at MSE filled
several large aerial bombs with tear gas. According to the report,
helicopters dropped up to 200 of these bombs on rebel targets near Karbala
and Najaf. The report also notes that Ir=
aq
brought several trailers with mustard-filled aerial bombs to the base as
well, although the bombs were never unloaded or used.
Each R-400 aerial bomb can hold approximately 90 liters of chemical
agent, and its effective use would have probably caused substantial
casualties, but it is not clear how many casualties can be attributed to
the sarin use.
Ewen Buchanan, spokesperson for the UN Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) said that the selection and bungled use=
of
the sarin-filled R-400s made some sense from the regime’s
perspective. “As the Iraqis explained to me, ‘beggars
can’t be choosers,’ and the R-400s were likely what was
available at the time,” he said, noting that UNMOVIC had not unco=
vered
this incident during its investigation. “It was probably more
important to use some kind of chemical weapon for its psychological eff=
ects
on the enemy.”
By contrast, in the March 1988 attack, Iraq
was free to use its full chemical weapons arsenal. =
Iraq
used mustard gas, tabun, VX, and sarin against Kurds in Halabja in nort=
hern
Iraq. A=
bout
5,000 deaths are directly attributable to the chemical weapons used, and
another 10,000 people were blinded, maimed, or disfigured. The Iraqi
Special Tribunal, established by the provisional Iraqi government in 20=
03
to try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Ba`a=
th
Party’s reign, has been investigating the use of chemical weapons
against the Kurds. The body will be responsible for the trials of Saddam
Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid, better known as “Chemical
Ali,” the general who allegedly ordered the use of chemical weapo=
ns.
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